The month-long event is co-sponsored by the Los Angeles County Department of Military and Veteran Affairs and the Southern California Committee for Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Ending of WWII (SCCC70WWII)

Location: Bob Hope Patriotic Hall, 1816 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles

Parking: The building has its own parking lot with a capacity of 80 cars.  Arrangements have been made with Los Angeles Trade Technical College, 400 W Washington Blvd. Los Angeles, to provide additional parking spaces, which are about half a block from Patriotic Hall, on August 7, 14 and 15.

1. Opening ceremony: 2:00 to 4:00 pm, Friday August 7th, 2015.  2nd Floor Lincoln Room, Free admission.

General Wong will chair the ceremony; introduce VIPs and representatives of veterans’ organizations.  After brief remarks by distinguished guests, Mr. Leo Soong will present the featured speech titled “The Soong Family and WWII”.  Leo is a nephew of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and Dr. T.V. Soong who played key roles in shaping all the US-China relations during WWII.  Leo will share with us many stories and observations from his unique perspective. 

2. Retrospective Exhibition: 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, August 7th to August 25th, 2015. Saturday and Sunday are closed except August 15th, which is open.  Lobby, Free admission. Doolittle Raid, Flying Tigers, U.S. Army 14th Air Forces and National Chinese Expeditionary Force.

3. Photo Exhibit and Chinese Brush Painting of the Chinese Resistance to Japan’s Occupation: 8:00 am to 5:00 pm, August 7th to August 28th, 2015. Saturday and Sunday are closed except August 15th, which is open.    Basement Dining Hall, Free admission.

4. Screenings of WWII Videos: 9:00 am to 5:00 pm, August 7th, 14th and 15th, 8th floor Nimitz Room, Free admission.

5. Lunch 1, hosted by US-China Forum: 11:45 am to 1:45 pm, Friday, August 14th, 2015.  Basement Dining Hall, Ticket holders only.

6. Symposium 1 Cooperative Peace in Asia, Jointly Sponsored by US-China Forum and US-China Institute, USC: 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm, Friday, August 14th, 2015.  2nd Floor Lincoln Room, Free admission.

7. Symposium 2 Memory of WWII, Jointly Sponsored by US-China Forum and US-China Institute, USC: 10:00 am to 12:00 pm, Saturday, August 15th, 2015. 2nd Floor Lincoln Room, Free admission.

8. Lunch 2, hosted by SCCC70WWII: 12:00 pm to 1:45 pm, Saturday August 15th, 2015. Basement Dining Hall, Ticket holders only.

9. Medallion Presentation Ceremony and a Reception to immediate follow: 2:00 pm to 4:30 pm, Saturday August 15th, 2015. 1st Floor Auditorium, Ticket holders only.

The Foreign Affairs Magazine published a special issue (May/June 2015), Titled, China Now. This issue contains its usual essays, reviews, responses, and a set of seven articles about China. The article, “What It Means to Be Chinese” by Perry Link made me read it twice with great interest. Later, Ken Wu, a friend in Taiwan, called my attention and asked my opinion about it. I wrote my opinion back to him. He urged me to submit it as a comment to Perry Link’s article. Unfortunately, the comment button on Foreign Affairs was not active. Since this topic is very interesting to all Chinese including American Chinese, I decided to introduce Link’s article and offer my comments in this column..

Professor Perry Link is a Chancellorial Chair for Innovation in Teaching Across Disciplines at  University of California, Riverside. His latest book is on ‘Chinese’, entitled, An Anatomy of Chinese: Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics. So Professor Link’s article in Foreign Affairs is a seasoned writing about Chinese and a stimulating dissertation on defining Chinese with a political focus, in terms of nationalism and present day Xi’s China. He start out with a characterization of pre-modern Chinese with heaven-sanctioned principles guiding  proper human (Chinese) behavior and traditional Confucian civilization defining human relations such as leader-follower, father-son, husband-wife, etc. This traditional philosophy and its derived moral-political model were able to resist foreign influence such as Buddhism, northern conquerors and other Asian and West invaders. The moral-political system was powerful enough to make others to adapt to the ‘Chinese’ way until the arrival of the industrialized Westerners. They broke the Chinese model and made the Chinese to recognize the need to change. However, the Chinese only do or change what is necessary, still wanting to keep her core of Chineseness.

Can the moral model of pre-modern Chinese still stand or must be displaced by newer idea of political morality? A question challenged the Chinese Communist Party since Mao’s time. The West brought to China not only technology but also Western notion of democracy, human right and modernization. The changes faced resistance; in recent decades the CCP tried to revive the traditional moral-political model with modern adaptation. Link describes Xi’s Chinese Dreams with focus on wealth, national pride and respect for authority but not on morality. The CCP accepts the terms of democracy, human right and modernization but with Chinese characterization to fit CCP with a desire to export a successful Chinese model of development to others and return China to the center of the world. Link says that this vision is a possibility but not certainty.

Link then characterized China’s concern for instability with a number of sources. One is the generation gap where the young people are materialistic, nationalistic and aggressive and the old accept more western indoctrination. Second is the wealth gap, a considerably widening gap causing the poor resenting the rich. Third is the power struggle among elites who enriched themselves through graft with insecurity, causing them to send their wealth abroad, their kids to the West even to have their babies born in the West. These instability sources in addition to the geographical instability linked with external influence in Tibet, Xinjiang (Uighur), Taiwan and Hong Kong are certainly challenging the Chinese leader Xi. Link asserts, although Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is earning him popularity, but Link is pessimistic about the ultimate outcome. Link questions Xi’s ability to compare to Mao to succeed in mobilizing the people, citing that Internet is making people hard to be controlled as in Mao’s time.

Link quoted Jonathan Spence’s book, “The Search for Modern China”, “For nearly two centuries, the great ancient civilization of China has been looking for a way to reinvent itself for the modern era. This process has involved fits, starts, and reversals. It has caused trauma and led to at least 70 million unnatural deaths.” Then Link made his final remark, “The key questions today are whether the Communist Party’s project to revive Chinese-style authoritarianism in modern clothing will succeed and, if so, what its effects will be—both on China and on the world at large.” Link is betting against CCP’s success, citing the clear long-term trend toward greater popular participation in politics. The Chinese government has pulled off unexpected successes in many areas in recent decades and could surprise the world by engineering its retrograde political vision at home and export authoritarianism abroad; Link asserts both China and the world would suffer and a vision of Chinese identity more suitable for the present age evading.

China as a big country and her 1.3 billion Chinese people are not easy to characterize. Link made broad observations about the pre-modern traditional Chinese philosophy and moral model. He also touched on the issues as the Chinese were making a transition to a modern China. It is true that the Chinese has experienced a treacherous revolution trying to establish a republic nation and searching for a moral-political model with a safe and stable path to modernization. However, the difficulties the Chinese faced and the slow progress they achieved were not so much due to weak leaders or stubborn resistance, rather it was largely because of external interferences, the intrusion of Western powers, the Japanese invasion, the influence of the Soviet Union and the sanctions applied to the Chinese isolating them from the world. The Chinese has made a significant progress economically since being admitted to the world economy in the last three decades, indicating clearly that the Chinese is an adaptive people with the smarts to absorb and keep good values of the capitalistic system. Taiwan and Hong Kong each has adopted a different political system successfully, suggesting equally that the Chinese people are flexible to political models. Hence I would not be as pessimistic as Professor Link in predicting failure on China’s effort to find a moral-political model to suit the mainland as well accommodating Hong Kong and Taiwan.  

Although Link’s article is interesting and stimulating, his attempt to interpret Chinese tradition and trends of modernization may border ‘superficial’ as he said about the west having a superficial understanding of modern China. Confucius and Mencius believed that human nature having both good and evil traits; education and environment are critical to shape human behavior. China has been poor for long and Chinese absorbed numerous intruders throughout the history resulting in many dialectic and local cultural differences. But the core Chinese philosophy evolved from 5000 years of history binds and persists. One of her core principle is ‘Wang Dao’ (non-violent and seeking good and shedding evil). The internet is a blessing to China to leapfrog over Western nations in cultivating modern civilization among diverse races and culture while keeping the core Chineseness. So long as China or Chinese is putting high priority on education (she always does), the nation is heading to a bright identity and a working system tomorrow.

One weakness of Link’s article is assuming that the CCP did not change or has not changed or does not want to change. In my observation over the years from Mao to Deng and now to Xi, the CCP has changed for the better and wants to change even though it does worry about stability. Lack of political stability is the fundamental reason for China’s slow progress in political reform. My other disagreement with Professor Link is his assuming Mao being superior and Xi is no Mao, hence unable to mobilize the Chinese people. Link made this assumption without proof. Whether Xi will surpass Mao or not is not relevant since the history shows that the Chinese leaders following Mao all have made significant contribution to China’s modernization despite of the corruption in CCP. The current anti-corruption campaign in China may not wipe out corruption 100%, but it will turn a new leaf for the CCP. CCP is a large party each year adding more than one million new members. From party reform point of view, this political regeneration process could be the greatest and fastest in the world.

The CCP desires to change for obvious self preservation reason. CCP’s vision to develop a moral-political model with Chinese characteristics is not easy to articulate and also difficult for vast majority of Chinese to understand and appreciate. However, the change momentum (with no external interference) may be slow initially but will accelerate eventually. Most political analysts in the West fail to see this. The definition of being Chinese today will change with the change process.  Chinese ‘citizenship’ will emerge with her Chinese characteristics continuously evolving, keeping some of the 5000 years virtues and adapting some of the modern values. Of course, this change process is not simple; stability is critical, hence China is extremely leery of any external influence to her internal stability.

A couple of years ago, the Diaoyu Islands, a territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea, had flared up as a hotspot in the news media. The provocation started by the Japanese government’s renege on an agreement to table the dispute.  In 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka who was seeking formal diplomatic relations between the two countries that priority should be placed on the overall interests of bilateral ties not on the issue of Diaoyu Islands. In August 1978, the year of signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China, Deng Xiaoping, then first Vice Premier told Sunao Sonoda, the Japanese Foreign Minister, to put off the Diaoyu Islands dispute issue and later in October, Deng in his visit to Japan (PM Takeo Fukuda), declared in a press conference: “They (both sides) promised (1972) and agreed (1978) not to touch the issue”. Hence the Diaoyu Islands dispute was known to be shelved until a later date.

In 2012, Japanese government adopted a scheme to purchase three of the five Diaoyu islands, trying to nationalize them. China reacted strongly and numerous large anti-Japanese protests erupted in China as well as elsewhere including California and New York. The dispute had tanked the Sino-Japanese relation to a valley that Japan business people were deeply concerned. Recently, a delegation of 3000 Japanese business leaders went to China to make amends. However, the Abe right-wing administration seems to be destined to occupy the Diaoyu Islands by inducing the U.S. to include the islands into the protected region under the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. Naturally, China and Taiwan would not accept such maneuver; hence the Diaoyu Islands remain as a trouble spot in the East China Sea but it will not be inflamed as long as Japan refrains from provoking China on the issue. Now the world attention has shifted to the South China Sea. 

Public waters were defined as 3 sea miles away from governed land but fishing rights, ocean resources and pollution control issues often extended beyond the 3 mile zone. In 1945, U.S. President Truman first announced that the U.S. ocean sovereignty extended to continental shelf. Subsequently, many nations declared sea sovereignty to 12 to 200 sea miles. In 1947 post WW II, the Republic of China had declared a eleven dotted line to define China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea based on historical Chinese Sovereignty and later in 1949, the People’s Republic China took over the Chinese mainland adopted the eleven-dotted-line and redrawn into a nine-dotted line to define her South China Sea sovereignty. Even though international maps made by McNally had exhibited China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea, this nine-dotted line (included therein the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands) seemed to be the starting point of the disputes. First, in 1970s, the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries began referring to the Spratly Islands as included in their own territory. The Philippines began exploring the areas west of PalawanPalawanPalawan for oil in 1970. Exploration in the area began in Reed Bank/Tablemount. In 1976, gas was discovered following the drilling of a well. However, China's objection halted the exploration. Then on June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory. Energy resources, fishing opportunities and maritime routes (several hundred ships passing per day, though bulk of them going to Chinese ports) are the main motives creating these island disputes. [updatThe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into effect on 16 November 1994, did not help solving these intensifying island disputes. As of 1996, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and other countries asserted claims within the Chinese nine-dotted line.

One positive agreement was reached on 20 July 2011 by the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, which defined a set of preliminary guidelines helpful in resolving the disputes. This agreement was an important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries regarding marine environmental protection, scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and combating transnational crime, except the issue of oil and natural gas drilling. Apparently energy resource is the ‘interest’ that the smaller nations are disputing with China on those almost totally un-inhabited islands. The Ministry of Geological Resources and Mining of the People's Republic of China estimate that the South China Sea may contain 17.7 billion tons of crude oil (compared to Kuwait with 13 billion tons). Other sources claim less, only 7.5 billion barrels, or about 1.1 billion tons (6% of the Chinese claim, US EIA Geological Survey gave a slightly higher estimate). Perhaps it is a mistake for China to disclose her studies, in the years following the announcement by the ministry, the claims regarding the South China Sea islands intensified. (Some net-citizens had remarked: it was stupid to tell the world that you had gold nuggets buried in your backyard) A wide variety of natural gas resource estimations, ranging from 900 trillion cubic feet (25.5 trillion cubic meters) to 2 quadrillion cubic feet (56.6 trillion cubic meters) was also declared in the EIA report.

In an earlier column, we have discussed the history of the dispute between Vietnam and China over their border and the Paracel Islands. Vietnam had been aggressive regarding sovereignty dispute with China even resulted in war. Through treaties and war settlements, as of 2012, all of Paracel Islands are under Chinese control as rightly so by Chinese history and post WW II settlement. The situation regarding the Spratly Islands is more complicated; currently eight are under Chinese control, twenty nine under Vietnamese control, eight under the control of Philippines, five by Malaysia, two by Brunei and one by Taiwan. Indeed, it is a complex situation. The recent U.S. Pivot to Asia policy, whether intentionally or not, encouraged Asian nations to challenge China’s rise and added fuel to these hot spots in the South China Sea. The righteous position the U.S. is taking is: “to ensure Maritime freedom through the South China Sea”. The U.S. is denouncing the land reclamation effort done by China on some of the South China Sea Islands as threatening to the maritime freedom. In reality, Vietnam and Philippines started land reclamation long before China did, except China’s effort is backed by more technology and engineering rendering their infrastructure projects more effective. The deeper ports, airfields even horticultural and recreational facilities are thus capable of fulfilling the multilateral agreement reached in 2011 for providing navigation communication, scientific research, search and rescue, combating transnational crime and perhaps even tourism. After all, Maritime freedom is China’s utmost concern, since 40-50% of her world trade pass through South China Sea. Prior to the new round of agitation in claims, there was never any issue with Maritime freedom in South China Sea. As one of the U.S. political analyst stated, these islands had no human population to speak of; the maritime conduct could be easily managed by agreement among nations under the guidelines of UNCLOS. Even the attractive energy resources under the South China Sea could be explored with collaborative effort since China had repeatedly invited partners to do joint exploration and development.    

Island dispute is not limited to the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The tension over the Kurile Islands in the Northern Pacific (with Russia), Dokdo Island (with Korea) and the Diaoyu Islands (with China) illustrate Japan’s ‘historical’ territorial ambition. Russia has controlled the northern Kuril Islands since the 19th century, but she seized the southern islands at the end of World War II acting on the basis of the Yalta agreement. This has been a sore point between the two countries ever since — to the point that they’ve never actually signed a peace treaty ending the war. Japan supposedly renounced all rights to their occupation to territories they seized or occupied prior to WW II (including Korea, Formosa, Pescadores, Kurile, the Pacific Islands, the Spratly and the Paracel Islands, etc.) in the 1951 San Francisco Treaty signed with the Allied powers formally ending the war. The imprecise (unfavorable to China) language and unilateral execution of the U.S. trusteeship in the San Francisco Treaty gained no consent from the People’s Republic of China (and the Republic of China) and Russia, thus causing Japan’s revived territorial ambition and disputes on the Diaoyu, Paracel and Spratly islands in the East and South China Sea.