Professor Jessica Chen Weiss (JCW) published her interview with Ryan Hass (RH a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policies Studies) on the Washington Post Monkey Cage Analysis, entitled ‘The Cold War Is a Poor Analogy for Today’s U.S.-China Tensions’. RH served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia at the National Security Council during the Obama administration. JCW is a political scientist and professor of government at Cornell University, as well as an editor at the Washington Post Monkey Cage blog and a non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. JCW posted five questions to RH referencing his 2021 book: 1. Where do you see China headed? 2. Assessment of U.S. sanction efforts to China tech giants such as Huawei’s? 3. Where and what successes the U.S. influenced (pushed) China? 4. Referring to G7 ‘Build Back Better World’ (BBBW), how effective is the U.S. led competition against China’s BRI? 5. Differences and similarities between Cold War and today’s U.S.-China situation? This paper will review the JCW-RH interview and offer an opinion on each Q and A.
 
RH has given to-the-point answers to the five questions however with arguments understandably influenced by his political background. On Q1, RH cited ballooning debt, aging population, shrinking productivity and vulnerability in food and fuel supply making China’s continued economic ascent less guaranteed. Further, he stated that with her political system less dynamic and international image declining, China will be constrained globally but will remain an endurable competitor because of the strength in her innovative ecosystem, 800 million citizens lifted above poverty, and a clear vision of rejuvenating the nation. In this author’s opinion, the above arguments and conclusion might be plausible but not comforting if the U.S. was assessed on the same balance by the same factors, debt, aging, productivity, dysfunctional political system, deficits in trade, diminishing reputation on the world stage, etc. This may be the fundamental reason that ‘China Threat’ and ‘Fear China’ are being inflated on the foreign policy dialogue. Furthermore, the U.S. has unnecessarily put too much attention and energy on China rather than focus inward on flaws of the American political system and economic problems. Solving the U.S. domestic issues such as infrastructure, industry revitalization, healthcare, homeless, wealth gap and competitive productivity is more beneficial to the U.S. than targeting China to wish her demise.
 
On Q2, RH stated that “limits on Huawei’s access to computer chips made with U.S. inputs, have pushed the company to consider moving away from smartphones and 5G technology toward less chip-intensive technologies.” China in response is intensifying her drive toward self-reliance. RH’s view is that “the more China turns toward indigenous innovation, effectively limiting its ability to draw on the talent and ingenuity of the rest of the world, the more it could slow itself down. That would be China’s choice.” This author felt that RH should have noted the fact that the U.S. policy change of restricting Chinese scientists and students to come to the U.S. to participate in technology research will slow the U.S. as well, perhaps more severely since China produces many more STEM graduates than the U.S. does each year.
 
On Q3, RH responded with three examples: 1. Intensive U.S.-China economic coordination around the 2008-2009 global financial crisis helped avert global economic depression, China’s currency appreciated, trade balance with the world lessened and Chinese demand for imports fueled global economic expansion, 2. China joined the international response to the Ebola outbreak in 2014 and helped Africa in public health, and 3. China became a key player in securing agreement at the Paris climate conference in 2015. RH further claimed that “the currently elevated tensions in the U.S.-China relationship defies unilateral solutions, whether the challenge is stopping COVID-19, strengthening global health security, building a more inclusive global economy or tackling the climate crisis. From this author’s observation, the above U.S. successes in influencing (pushing) China, are actually perceived differently by international political analysts as China’s success in understanding the U.S. financial turmoil (credit bubble) and world issues (virus management and climate change control). China’s recent achievements in environmental protection, energy and transportation grid, COVID management, space exploration, and exporting infrastructure projects, etc. are evidences that China is capable of planning and executing programs for her and world’s benefits without any nation to push her.
 
On Q4, RH said that “Western countries cannot compete on a cost basis for constructing roads and railways. The G7 ‘BBBW’ initiative will likely be more effective if it avoids attempting to out-China China, Instead, focusing on building digital technology infrastructure, investing in climate resilience and supporting good governance.” In this author’s view, it makes more sense to cooperate rather than compete with China’s BRI and to stop all smearing propaganda against China. The fact that China embraces the UN and receives more support from its members than the U.S. does should serve as a reminder to the U.S.: Condescending diplomacy days are over.
 
On Q5, the key question, RH remarked: “The Cold War is a poor analogy for understanding U.S.-China relations today.” I fully agree with his arguments that 30 years of global war and depression then is very different from 30 years of great power peace and global economic expansion now. The Soviet Union exploited power vacuums along its periphery then and China is surrounded by capable powers in Asia today. The Soviet Union was weak and isolated in its economy then, China is deeply embedded in the global economy as the driving engine today. Thus, I agree with RH; containment is not an option for dealing with China, since no U.S. allies or partners would be eager to align with the U.S. against China. RH did point out “one similarity to the Cold War is the risk of a devastating military conflict between two nuclear-armed superpowers. Only time will tell whether U.S. and Chinese leaders would choose to prioritize risk reduction.” In this author's opinion, this risk may be contained so long China adheres to her policy (never to use nuclear weapon first) and the U.S. does not provoke China to war. There are just too much to lose if the two great powers would engage in a hot war. It is surprising though that RH makes only a light remark “only time will tell” rather than offering some serious recommendations.
 
In this interview, JCW did not ask and RH did not comment on the current Biden's China policy. Reviewing what has happened, the U.S. busy seeking alliances, engaging military exercises in South China Sea, and arming Taiwan to confront, agitate and provoke China, all negative actions that will hurt the U.S. and the world's economic stability. The Biden Administration is clearly conducting a hostile China policy; RH (and Brookings Institute) should make explicit recommendations to turn his negative actions to positive policies. Judging from RH's another Brookings Institute article, entitled, 'Taiwan Voters Should Look Before They Leap on Pork Referendum' (7/12/2021 Order from Chaos), RH was very explicit in giving advice with a patriotic stand - warning Taiwan voters not to reverse Tsai Yin-Wen’s decision of allowing import of U.S. pork containing ractopamine. This is a serious health concern, especially FOR Taiwan people Who consume a lot of pork meat, pork internal organs and many derivative food products made from pork. Taiwan also exports many pork food products to other countries. It is understandable why the pork issue has risen to the level as a referendum for the entire population to vote on but nevertheless it is just a domestic issue. This author is surprised that RH would go so far to warn Taiwan citizens that their voting may seriously affect trade relations with the U.S. He even implied that the pork referendum may affect the American commitment to Taiwan thus its security, an apparent message of threat. On the other hand, the U.S.-China tensions is a far more serious national security issue concerning both the U.S. and China, yet RH is far from explicit in advising his readers, the American people, what is wrong with the current U.S.-China policy and why it is dangerous with a real possibility of driving the U.S. into a nuclear war.
 

 
Rush Doshi, current Director of China in Biden's National Security Council (NSC), published a new book written before his present job, “The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (Bridging the Gap)” on July 8th, 2021. This book received Brookings Institute's promotion and stirred up quite a bit of attention. Matt Pottinger, former Deputy National Security Adviser in the Trump Administration also wrote an essay, “Beijing's American Hustle – How Chinese Grand Strategy Exploits U.S. Power”, published in Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021 issue, in which he cited and agreed with Doshi's analysis of China's Grand Strategy. The timed focus on Chinese Grand Strategy by the above two authors may be coincidental but both, fluent in Mandarin with scholar/journalist background, claimed its existence long before the recent U.S. Administrations intrigued me.  This column shall question “the existence of such a grand strategy aimed at displacing American power” by reviewing Doshi's book.
 
Rush Doshi took a very good Chinese name, Du Rusong, 杜若松, meaning that he is like a pine tree. In China, pine trees appear in many artists' paintings as a tree with strong character, green in all seasons even in bitter cold winter and strong against wind even in severe storms (Pottinger also has a Chinese name Bo Ming, 博明, broadly bright）showing his proficiency in Chinese. Doshi graduated from Princeton University and received a Ph.D. from Harvard University. He formerly worked at the Brookings Institute leading a research team to collect data about Chinese diplomatic strategies and digitizing relevant documentations. His research includes China's grand strategy and Indo-Pacific security issues. His works have been published in The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs magazine, Washington Post, International Organizations, Washington Quarterly, etc. He has been the Special Advisor to the President of the Asian Group prior to his present position. Brookings published a long in-depth introduction and chapter outlines on his new book (Brookings website, 8-2-2021). This book can be said to be Doshi’s meticulous masterpiece. It covers Western views on China and also reveals his personal imagination. I have been engaged in observations and comments on Sino-US affairs for many years but mainly based on facts not on presumption or extrapolation, thus never ventured into 'grand strategy' discussion. Doshi's book not only aroused my interest, but also gave me the feeling that it would be somewhat influential to readers because of its voluminous references, However, the book's conclusion may be misleading, The current review is written to draw public discussion on his claim of China's grand strategy.
 
Doshi quoted Li Hongzhang's "Great Changes Unseen in Three Thousand Years" (Li was prime minister for the last years of Qing Dynasty) and Xi Jinping's "Major Changes Unseen in a Century" to emphasize that the former represents China’s unprecedented humiliation and disasters, while the latter represents China’s opportunities including her  cultural revival. Xi believes that China has felt its own rise and the decline of the West, so he believes that the next decade is a period of historical opportunity for China. Then Doshi used a series of questions to illustrate the theme of his book: What are China's ambitions? Does China have a grand strategy? If so, what is it? How is it formed? What should the U. S. do? His answer is: China's grand strategy is a displacement strategy, from the region to the world, China will replace the order established by the United States. First, China's motive is to defeat the control of US hegemony, and then establish China's control from the region to the world. This author believes that Doshi, like many Western political theorists making the same mistake, is inherently subjective,  (if U.S. think or do so, others will do the same), not objectively analyzing China's motives. Doshi himself also said that he did not find any book on China's grand strategy, not a single book which clearly stated 'what China's grand strategy is'. On the contrary, anyone who cares about U.S. diplomacy and military affairs must have read the white papers or basket of papers regularly published by US government, officials and think tanks, clearly expounding her strategy, especially recently, strategies against China.
 
From my own observation, most governments have discussions and researches on international strategic issues, but such discussion are not the same as the implemented state strategy. (U.S. does carry out its strategy!) To deal with the American power in the world, countries have to take reactive measures (responding to pressure), regardless of the size of the country. Since its founding, China had to adopt reactive diplomatic policies and actions to deal with foreign nations. That is why Chinese coined the diplomatic phrases. “when soldiers come to attack, we must send wise generals to resolve it and when flood water comes, we must use soil to stop the water”. (兵来将挡， 水来土掩）Some Western scholars, including Doshi are accustomed to the hegemonic behavior and thinking of the United States. Now they have witnessed China's gradual tougher diplomatic responses. They subjectively believe that China is also adopting a hegemonic strategy like the U.S. does. It is very convenient to imagine a Chinese grand strategy, which is to push the dominance of the U.S. away from the region (Asia pacific) then from the world, i.e. displacing U.S. order and establishing Chinese order. Doshi's book also mentioned that when the United States re-examined its China policy, the opinions of all parties were not completely unanimous in agreement. When judging what China wants and where China is heading, some think that China has global ambitions, some think that it is only regional, some think that China has a century-old plan, but some think that China is just reactive and opportunistic, and some think that China is a revisionist hegemony. Others say that China just wants to maintain peace and stability in order to continue her development of raising her citizens' standard of living, therefore only reactive to external pressure.
 
There are 13 chapters in Doshi's book. The content is worth reading, but its conclusions must be debated. At the end, Doshi reminded everyone to pay attention to and to understand China’s grand strategy. He also suggested that the United States should use Chinese methods to deal with China. In addition to coping with internal problems in the United States, it should also invest in the outside world and establish order to prevent 'non-liberalism' forces to expand. These ideological statements as conclusions are really too much like political slogans to be accepted. This author believes that although Doshi has worked hard and has collected a lot of data, he failed (bogged down by subjective ideological views) to objectively analyze China’s reactionary diplomacy (evidenced by at least one century of facts when China was bullied and pushed by external forces) and why she desires to take non-reactive but self-determined diplomatic measures towards the United States. China gradually gained self-confidence through her successes in economic development which permits her moving from reactive diplomacy to self-determined China-interest-first diplomacy (American first has been practiced by the U.S. ever since her independence 250 years ago). China ideologically uses “cultural Revival” (Cultural Renaissance) as the nation's motivation force, sets “lifting above poverty” as the nation's prime goal and deploy “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) program as a sustainable economic co-development plan with the world.  BRI is a mutually beneficial economic development plan, that is China's recent grand strategy, not to replace the U.S. It was the U.S.'s own choice of boycotting the “BRI” program which received 139 countries' endorsement including the cunning U. K. The Chinese grand strategy Doshi and Pottinger referred to is a product of the U.S. China policy – A natural reaction from China responding to the U.S. pressure to suppress China's rise.
 
As long as the U.S. understands this and treats China with respect, a win-win Sino-US relationship between the two powers can be expected. The two great nations can engage in a Cool War where competition is selective, cooperation takes place when competition is not an option. Cold War may lead to a hot war or possibly a world war but a Cool War benefits the world, the makind, no matter which nation is the number one economy in the world.




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As an empire, the decay of U.K. was inevitable since WW II. The war had defeated U.K. In many aspects even though as part of the Ally she won at the end. Two major consequences of the war basically prescribed the fate of British Empire in the coming century. One is that the colonialism was pronounced dead no matter how the colonial powers wanted to maintain it. Two is that the economy and the military power of U.K. was devastated to the point it was difficult to return to her pre-war status. The U.S. came out the strongest winner in manufacturing and military power benefiting from the war occurring outside of North America. Inevitably, the U.S. would lead the world to recovery with her Marshall Plan for Europe and a restoration plan for Japan. Strategically, the U.S. took the opportunity of constructing an anti-communism alliance countering the expansionism of the post-war Soviet Union with NATO (formed in 4-4-1949) established in Europe. In Asia, the U.S. was the occupier of Japan for seven years (1945-1952) restructuring Japan's political system and industrial base. The occupation ended in 1952 shortly after the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by 49 countries on September 8, 1951. The U.S. and Japan entered into a security sharing relationship which was later negotiated into a Mutual Alliance Treaty signed on January 19, 1960 in Washington DC, finally approved by the Japanese Diet despite of violent protests by the Japanese leftists.   
 
The U.K. adopted the strategy to be the most intimate ally of the U.S. content with a follower position in the international arena as well as in the world economy. The U.S. was the world's strongest economy and military power and the U.K. was functioning under the superpower's wings to maintain her kingdom image and to sustain a struggling economy with world competition not only from European nations but also Asian countries. Due to population and resources disadvantage, the British aisles have difficulty keeping up with the world in hard goods manufacturing but to rely more on financial engineering and soft power. This situation does not provide an optimistic long term prospect for several reasons. One is that the U.S. (for different reasons from the U.K.) is gradually moving into the financial sphere becoming the dominant player often taking everyone's lunch. In addition, the developed nations in Europe and particularly late comers in Asia have all become strong competitors in the world economy. The rise of China was apparently gaining China enough influence on the world stage, hence, returning Hong Kong (HK) to China (1997) was inevitable no matter how unwilling the U.K. was to part with a money making HK. China's continued near double digit economic growth in GDP for next two decades have made China a strong competitor to all.  This competition is threatening the economic dominance of the U.S., therefore, eventually leading into a trade war between the U.S. and China.
 
Into the twenty first century, the decline of the U.S. economic power has become obvious, finally evidenced by the global financial crisis triggered by the U.S. housing loan bubble in 2008. The crisis was saved by China by her buying U.S. treasury debt. As China has become the world number two economy (number one in terms of buying power), many country including U.K. must adjust their trade and economic development strategy. Facing this challenge, the U.K. is forced into a reactionary position with no clear long term policy. This can be seen from her relationship with China, the U.S. and EU. First, the U.K. wasn't sure how to maneuver in the EU system to maximize her economic gain, hence there was the Brexit issue which took a while to decide and still not resolved with a clean break with EU. The U.K. left the EU on January 31, 2020 with a deal called Withdrawal Agreement which covered 1) agreeing a transition period and how it could work, 2) How to prevent border check at Irish border and 3) U.K.'s financial settlement with EU.  There is the 11 month transition period ending December 31, 2020 with a deadline of extending the transition already passed. The issues stuck at negotiation level include a trade deal, immigration rules, fishing access and security co-operation. If the transition period is passed without an accord, then tariffs and border checks will take place. What will happen remains to be seen, hence you may say that UK is in a yoyo state as far as exit from EU.
 
Towards China, the U.K. was perhaps even more uncertain. For a while, U.K. was extremely friendly towards China, very much eager to be her partner. She joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiated by China early to support China's One Belt One Road initiative. However, when the U.S. anteed up her anti-China policy with trade war, technology sanction and military intervention in the South China Sea with an ambitious NATO-like alliance in mind for the Indo-Pacific region targeting China, the U.K. yoyoed. First, the U.K. and the U.S. took the same stand supporting HK protests which were turning into violence. That was a clear case of double standard, comparing the rationale and government measure in HK riots with those happening in the U.S. and U.K. Now, China has passed a national security law to protect HK, the riots are stopped. However, the U.K. announced a policy permitting British National Overseas (BNO) to apply visa to settle in UK with opportunity to apply for citizenship later. Obviously, this policy displeases China. UK Home Office estimates around 3M people with BNO status and some 500,000 could arrive in the first year as an extreme scenario, more likely 123,000 to 153,000 people would arrive in the UK in the first year, and between 258,000 and 322,400 over five years. U.K. expects a lot of them to be educated workers with wealth potentially paying taxes boosting the UK economy by 2.4B pounds. Judging the economic prospect of U.K versus China, this is absolutely a fantasy, a wishful thinking the best. Only those people with money acquired in shady manners would escape to UK, not workers, since the job opportunity is far better in HK and China.
 
As the world is watching, the U.S. is pulling all stops to resist Huawei company to dominate the 5G business, despite of the fact that Huawei leads with patents (3000 applications and 1200 granted, collecting $1.2B and paying $6M in licensing fees) in 5G technology and standards and business relations with 170 countries. On this matter, the U.K. is yoyoing again. First, she denied Huawei had any backdoor security exposure in its telecommunication equipment when the U.S. accused Huawei, then she joined the U.S. to forbid Huawei to bring its 5G technology into their domestic markets, eventually removing any existing Huawei equipment. This pattern of yoyoing, to some degree, reflects the U.K. government's inability to act independently from the U.S. We don't need to dwell on the false logic of the U.S. in adopting a self-inflicting policy  to punish a civilian company, Huawei, but we must emphasize that the U.K. cannot afford to miss the 5G technology revolution (by yoyoing) which will bring electric car, AI-robotics and all sorts of Internet applications running at split second speed. Take financial application-transactions, China is already leading the world; adopting 5G a few years ahead of every one, one can imagine China's role in the financial world that the U.K. so depends on. A yoyoing UK will eventually be left bouncing on the side walk. As the editor in The Economist updated the article, A Ban on Huawei further worsen Britain's relations with China ( July, 11, 2020), to incorporate the announcement of Huawei's exclusion from 5G telecommunication network, many papers popped up: Banning Huawei, … likely worsen the deteriorating UK-China relation, London's Huawei decision 'turning point' for China-UK relation, Britain Fears Chinese Government Retaliation Over Huawei....  As British media are full of intelligent people, I expect someone will be honest enough to tell the UK politicians: a “yoyo' State or 'yoyo' China policy is not good for U.K. She must act as an independent nation for her own good.    




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