Dr. Wordman, bilingual columnist at China-US Forum
Under this title, as a current affairs commentator who is not a naval professional and has never personally participated in WPNS, I find three topics of public interest worthy of comments. One is the evolution of the Chinese navy since the first WPNS and its impact on the West Pacific. The second is that amid the constant maritime provocations in the South China Sea (SCS), the significance of the Philippines' absence from the 19th WPNS is significant. The third and most important point is the discussion and promotion of the code of conduct in the SCS. The third point is not only related to the first two but also has a causality relation. Military forums such as WPNS have strategic confidentiality, so generally, the news is few and brief, but many people do want to get more of it. This author wishes to express some opinions on the above three points to elicit resonance and discussion from readers.
The Chinese Navy has its unfortunate vicissitudes of history. Although China has glorious historical maritime records, such as Zheng He's seven voyages to the West in the Ming Dynasty, and even evidence of reaching the Americas, but after the Yongle Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, despite they had developed the world-leading sea-going ship technology during that time, the royal court strictly prohibited the manufacture of ocean-going ships (never mind advocating building a navy), because the overseas' culture was backward and the outer seas were infested with barbaric pirates. This caused the Qing Dynasty later to continue its policy of despising the sea. Japan imitated the British maritime hegemony and invaded China after establishing a navy. This also left a historical stain of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese naval battle, which intensified Japan's ambition to conquer the rich and resourceful China. The Fourteen Years’ War between China and Japan was fought on the Chinese mainland, mainly with the army and air force. The Chinese military and civilians fought to the death and finally won. Before World War II, the Chinese Navy never had the opportunity to develop into a strong maritime force.
The Chinese Navy had a difficult start. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China was devastated by the long war and desperately needed rebuilding. Only a prosperous country can have the financial resources to build arms forces. China has 14 neighboring countries and nearly 20,000 kilometers of coastline. Its national defense and security are hinged on relations with Russia, Japan, the Koreas, and India, and more so dominated by the United States with its containment strategy. Thus, China has great hidden worries and concerns while recovering its economy. The Chinese Navy slowly grew up in this environment. In the 20th century, the Chinese Navy could only be viewed as a traditional coastal defense force. It was not until the beginning of the 21st century (2000-2005) that the Chinese Navy truly shouldered the responsibility of national security, preventing Taiwan’s independence, and protecting China's growing presence and interests around the world, and the responsibility for maritime security and maintaining world peace. It was not until 2007-2009 (the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army) that the Chinese Navy embarked on the road to becoming a powerful force at sea, taking on important responsibilities in ocean defense, transportation, and supply, and strategic support.
The power of the navy, of course, depends on warships, submarines, aircraft carrier battle groups, and the weapons they possess. After China's economy developed, it was necessary to devote itself to military modernization amid the turmoil in the world, and threats on its shipping lanes and coastlines. Then the Chinese navy developed rapidly. China does not publish its naval power, but the U.S. has investigated and released the number of various Chinese naval vessels from 2005 to 2023 (See the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress). The total number of Chinese warships increased from 216 to 328, while that of the U.S, decreased from 292 to 289, a difference of 39 ships (2023). It is estimated that by 2030, the difference will be 135. The types of ships are different, for example, China currently has only three aircraft carriers while the U.S. has ten. However, China is growing rapidly and may have six aircraft carriers by 2030, in comparison, the U.S. aircraft carriers are aging requiring repair and long de-commission time. The language of this DOD report may be an exaggeration to obtain a higher military budget from Congress, but it does show that China has built the world's second-largest navy in the past 19 years.
The WPNS was founded in 1988 and held biannually. This year it was held in Qingdao, China on April 22nd. It was attended by more than 180 officials from 30 countries. The theme of the bi-annual meeting was “Oceans with Common Destiny”, and other agenda included a Review of the Forum Charter, Rules for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, and Disaster Response Guidelines Review. Day 2 was high-level seminars attended by multinational naval leaders focusing on 'global security initiatives and maritime peace and tranquility', 'maritime security cooperation and a maritime order based on international law', and 'discuss, build, and share the use and governance of the global oceans'. Three topics were discussed separately. It is noteworthy that the Philippines did not send a representative to participate in this symposium. By analysis, we may deduce the reasons for the Philippines' absence by the following points: For more than a year, the Philippines has intensified its entanglement with China on the Scarborough Shoal incident, apparently following the orders of the U.S. to continue to cause disputes in the SCS and purposefully hinder the SCS Code of Conduct promoted by ASEAN and China. This year China is the host country of WPNS, so the Philippines naturally feels awkward to participate. In addition, the topics in the meeting are related to maritime behavior, which makes it difficult for the Philippines to express any opposition alone. Since the Philippines is willing to be a pawn in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. would rather see the Philippines continuing to provoke China in the SCS behind the back than to be publicly condemned by ASEAN and China at WPNS, which would also cause the U.S to lose face.
China has always hoped to resolve disputes in the SCS through dialogue and consultation and eliminate external (U.S.) interference. China and ASEAN promote a code of conduct in the SCS is a peaceful approach to achieving stability. Unfortunately, the U.S. with its hegemonic mentality, wants to control the SCS from the Strait of Malacca to the Straits of Philippines and Taiwan, strategically choking the shipping lanes to China. The WPNS is certainly an available platform to advance the code of conduct in the SCS. However, the obstruction from the U.S. and the Philippines has become apparent. The Philippines' absence at the 19th WPNS is an annoyance, but anyone with a discerning eye will understand what is going on. The comments from ordinary people on the website are further proof. The author translated a few examples below to show how the Philippines' behavior is interpreted:
From Zhejiang, 'qwer3475': The Philippines has an inferiority complex.
From Hunan, 'telling the truth': The WPNS promotes pragmatic cooperation.
From Hebei, 'hot and trending searches': The Philippines did not come because they were afraid, fearing that it would affect morale. If they came, there would be news and reports. Wow, there are so many ships in China!
From Henan, 'the dragon flies into the sky': There is a psychological shadow.
From Anhui, 'free kickball': Our media style is too plain, so plain that it is not news at all. Without news, there will be no communication power. Without communication power, it means that you cannot occupy the podium, and others will pay less attention to your voice. We should not imitate some countries who make irresponsible remarks but try to answer with some interesting words and create some talking points for others, I think it would be beneficial to us in building our right to speak. Don't be afraid of others misunderstanding, twisting, or being surprised. Even if you shut up, others will still have something to say (monopolizing the speaking rights!).
After reading the above samples, you can imagine that there are many rational and smart people in China. Shouldn't overseas Chinese also speak up, resonate, and voice out for justice? Let America and the Philippines know that Chinese people are neither fools nor mute!
Under this title, as a current affairs commentator who is not a naval professional and has never personally participated in WPNS, I find three topics of public interest worthy of comments. One is the evolution of the Chinese navy since the first WPNS and its impact on the West Pacific. The second is that amid the constant maritime provocations in the South China Sea (SCS), the significance of the Philippines' absence from the 19th WPNS is significant. The third and most important point is the discussion and promotion of the code of conduct in the SCS. The third point is not only related to the first two but also has a causality relation. Military forums such as WPNS have strategic confidentiality, so generally, the news is few and brief, but many people do want to get more of it. This author wishes to express some opinions on the above three points to elicit resonance and discussion from readers.
The Chinese Navy has its unfortunate vicissitudes of history. Although China has glorious historical maritime records, such as Zheng He's seven voyages to the West in the Ming Dynasty, and even evidence of reaching the Americas, but after the Yongle Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, despite they had developed the world-leading sea-going ship technology during that time, the royal court strictly prohibited the manufacture of ocean-going ships (never mind advocating building a navy), because the overseas' culture was backward and the outer seas were infested with barbaric pirates. This caused the Qing Dynasty later to continue its policy of despising the sea. Japan imitated the British maritime hegemony and invaded China after establishing a navy. This also left a historical stain of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese naval battle, which intensified Japan's ambition to conquer the rich and resourceful China. The Fourteen Years’ War between China and Japan was fought on the Chinese mainland, mainly with the army and air force. The Chinese military and civilians fought to the death and finally won. Before World War II, the Chinese Navy never had the opportunity to develop into a strong maritime force.
The Chinese Navy had a difficult start. After the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China was devastated by the long war and desperately needed rebuilding. Only a prosperous country can have the financial resources to build arms forces. China has 14 neighboring countries and nearly 20,000 kilometers of coastline. Its national defense and security are hinged on relations with Russia, Japan, the Koreas, and India, and more so dominated by the United States with its containment strategy. Thus, China has great hidden worries and concerns while recovering its economy. The Chinese Navy slowly grew up in this environment. In the 20th century, the Chinese Navy could only be viewed as a traditional coastal defense force. It was not until the beginning of the 21st century (2000-2005) that the Chinese Navy truly shouldered the responsibility of national security, preventing Taiwan’s independence, and protecting China's growing presence and interests around the world, and the responsibility for maritime security and maintaining world peace. It was not until 2007-2009 (the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army) that the Chinese Navy embarked on the road to becoming a powerful force at sea, taking on important responsibilities in ocean defense, transportation, and supply, and strategic support.
The power of the navy, of course, depends on warships, submarines, aircraft carrier battle groups, and the weapons they possess. After China's economy developed, it was necessary to devote itself to military modernization amid the turmoil in the world, and threats on its shipping lanes and coastlines. Then the Chinese navy developed rapidly. China does not publish its naval power, but the U.S. has investigated and released the number of various Chinese naval vessels from 2005 to 2023 (See the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress). The total number of Chinese warships increased from 216 to 328, while that of the U.S, decreased from 292 to 289, a difference of 39 ships (2023). It is estimated that by 2030, the difference will be 135. The types of ships are different, for example, China currently has only three aircraft carriers while the U.S. has ten. However, China is growing rapidly and may have six aircraft carriers by 2030, in comparison, the U.S. aircraft carriers are aging requiring repair and long de-commission time. The language of this DOD report may be an exaggeration to obtain a higher military budget from Congress, but it does show that China has built the world's second-largest navy in the past 19 years.
The WPNS was founded in 1988 and held biannually. This year it was held in Qingdao, China on April 22nd. It was attended by more than 180 officials from 30 countries. The theme of the bi-annual meeting was “Oceans with Common Destiny”, and other agenda included a Review of the Forum Charter, Rules for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, and Disaster Response Guidelines Review. Day 2 was high-level seminars attended by multinational naval leaders focusing on 'global security initiatives and maritime peace and tranquility', 'maritime security cooperation and a maritime order based on international law', and 'discuss, build, and share the use and governance of the global oceans'. Three topics were discussed separately. It is noteworthy that the Philippines did not send a representative to participate in this symposium. By analysis, we may deduce the reasons for the Philippines' absence by the following points: For more than a year, the Philippines has intensified its entanglement with China on the Scarborough Shoal incident, apparently following the orders of the U.S. to continue to cause disputes in the SCS and purposefully hinder the SCS Code of Conduct promoted by ASEAN and China. This year China is the host country of WPNS, so the Philippines naturally feels awkward to participate. In addition, the topics in the meeting are related to maritime behavior, which makes it difficult for the Philippines to express any opposition alone. Since the Philippines is willing to be a pawn in the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, the U.S. would rather see the Philippines continuing to provoke China in the SCS behind the back than to be publicly condemned by ASEAN and China at WPNS, which would also cause the U.S to lose face.
China has always hoped to resolve disputes in the SCS through dialogue and consultation and eliminate external (U.S.) interference. China and ASEAN promote a code of conduct in the SCS is a peaceful approach to achieving stability. Unfortunately, the U.S. with its hegemonic mentality, wants to control the SCS from the Strait of Malacca to the Straits of Philippines and Taiwan, strategically choking the shipping lanes to China. The WPNS is certainly an available platform to advance the code of conduct in the SCS. However, the obstruction from the U.S. and the Philippines has become apparent. The Philippines' absence at the 19th WPNS is an annoyance, but anyone with a discerning eye will understand what is going on. The comments from ordinary people on the website are further proof. The author translated a few examples below to show how the Philippines' behavior is interpreted:
From Zhejiang, 'qwer3475': The Philippines has an inferiority complex.
From Hunan, 'telling the truth': The WPNS promotes pragmatic cooperation.
From Hebei, 'hot and trending searches': The Philippines did not come because they were afraid, fearing that it would affect morale. If they came, there would be news and reports. Wow, there are so many ships in China!
From Henan, 'the dragon flies into the sky': There is a psychological shadow.
From Anhui, 'free kickball': Our media style is too plain, so plain that it is not news at all. Without news, there will be no communication power. Without communication power, it means that you cannot occupy the podium, and others will pay less attention to your voice. We should not imitate some countries who make irresponsible remarks but try to answer with some interesting words and create some talking points for others, I think it would be beneficial to us in building our right to speak. Don't be afraid of others misunderstanding, twisting, or being surprised. Even if you shut up, others will still have something to say (monopolizing the speaking rights!).
After reading the above samples, you can imagine that there are many rational and smart people in China. Shouldn't overseas Chinese also speak up, resonate, and voice out for justice? Let America and the Philippines know that Chinese people are neither fools nor mute!
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